The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
1. Are there several persons in God?
2. How many are there?
3. What do our numerical terms mean in God?
4. How is the name of person common in God?
Article 1 — Are there several persons in God?
Objection:
1. Person is the individual substance of reasonable nature. Therefore, if there are many persons in God, it will follow that there are many substances in him, which seems heretical.
2. Several absolute properties do not make several persons, neither in God nor in us; so several relationships will do it even less. Now in God there is only a plurality of relationships, as we have said. We cannot therefore say that there are several persons in God.
3 . The truly one being, says Boethius speaking of God, is that which has no number. Now, every plurality implies a number. There are therefore not several persons in God.
4. Where there is plurality, there is whole and part. Therefore, if we have several persons in God, we will also have to place all and part in him: this contradicts divine simplicity.
In the opposite sense , S. Athanasius says: “One is the person of the Father, another that of the Son, another that of the Holy Spirit. ”The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are therefore several persons.
Answer:
There are many persons in God, according to our premises. Indeed, we have shown that the term “person” signifies in God the relationship as a reality subsisting in the divine nature. On the other hand we have established that there are several real relationships in God. It follows that there are several subsisting realities in the divine nature, in other words that there are several persons in God.
Solutions:
1 . In the definition of the person, the term “substance” does not mean the essence, but the suppositum, since “individual” is added. Now, to signify this substance, the Greeks use the term “hypostasis”; thus they say “the three hypostases”, as we say “the three persons”. On the other hand, with us it is not customary to say “three substances”: this term being equivocal, we do not want to imply “three essences”.
2.In God, absolute properties, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually opposed, and therefore are not really distinguished. Therefore, although they are subsistent, they do not make several subsistent realities, that is to say three persons. As for the absolute properties of creatures, they do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from one another, like whiteness and softness. But in God the relative properties are both subsistent and truly distinct from each other, as we have seen. This is why the plurality of these properties is enough to posit a plurality of persons in God.
3 . The supreme unity and simplicity of God makes us exclude from him any plurality of absolute attributes, but not of relative attributes. Because the relations qualify the subject in relation to another, thus implying no composition in the subject that they qualify. Boethius himself teaches this in the alleged work.
4 . There are two kinds of numbers: the simple or absolute number, such as two, three, four; and the number which is in the things numbered, as two men, two horses. Therefore, if we consider in God the number taken absolutely or abstractly, nothing prevents us from verifying everything and part of it; this only exists in the consideration of our mind, because the abstract number of realities counted is found only in thought. But we can consider number as it is in the things counted; then without doubt, if it concerns created things, one is two, or two is three as the part of the whole; for example, one man is less than two men, two are less than three. But this does not apply in God; we will see later that the Father is as great as the entire Trinity.
Article 2 — How many persons are there in God?
Objections:
1 . We have just said that in God it is the plurality of relative properties which results in a plurality of persons. Now there are four relationships in God: paternity, filiation, common spiration and procession. There are therefore four persons in God.
2 . In God, there is no more difference between nature and will than between nature and intelligence. Now, in God, the person who proceeds by the mode of will, as love, is distinguished from the person who proceeds by the mode of nature, as a son. Therefore the person who proceeds by mode of intelligence, as a verb, is also distinguished from the person who proceeds by mode of nature as son. And here we are again led to place more than three persons in God.
3. In creatures, what is excellent has more intimate operations; thus man has this privilege over animals that he is endowed with intelligence and will. Now, God infinitely surpasses every creature. In him therefore, if there is a procession of person, it will not only be by mode of will and intelligence, but by an infinity of other modes. There are therefore an infinite number of people in God.
4 . It is because of his infinite goodness that the Father communicates himself infinitely by producing a divine person. However, the Holy Spirit also possesses infinite goodness. Therefore he also produces one divine person, and this another, and so to infinity.
5 . Everything that is counted in finite number has a measure, since the number is a measure. Now, the divine Persons escape all measure, according to S. Athanasius: “Immense is the Father, immense is the Son, immense is the Holy Spirit. ”So they exceed the number three.
In the opposite sense , we read in the 1st letter of St. John (5, 7): “There are three who testify in heaven: the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit. ”And if we ask: Three what? we answer: Three Persons, as S. Augustine explains it. There are therefore only three Persons in God.
Answer:
The previously established theses necessarily make us posit three Persons in God, no more. Indeed, we have shown that “several persons” are several subsisting relationships, truly distinct from each other. And there is no real distinction between the divine relations except because of the relative opposition. Two opposing relationships therefore necessarily arise from two people; but if there are relationships which are not opposed, they necessarily belong to the same person.
From then on, paternity and filiation, which are two opposite relationships, necessarily belong to two persons: the subsisting paternity is therefore the person of the Father, and the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. If the other two relationships are not opposed to any of the two previous ones, they are opposed to each other, and consequently cannot both belong to the same person. It is therefore necessary either that one of the two belongs to these two people, or that one relation suits one of the two people, and the other relation to the other person. But the procession cannot suit the Father and the Son, not even just one of them: for it would follow that the intellectual procession (which is generation in God, and allows us to grasp the relations of paternity and of filiation) would come from the procession of love (which allows us to grasp the relationships of spiration and procession), since the person who generates and the one who is born would proceed from the one who breathes; this would contradict our principles. It therefore remains that spiration belongs both to the person of the Father and to that of the Son, since it has no relative opposition to either paternity or filiation. And therefore the procession must necessarily belong to another person; it is she who is called the person of the Holy Spirit, proceeding by way of love, as has been said. There are therefore only three persons in God: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
Solutions:
1 . There are indeed four relationships in God; but one of them, spiration, instead of standing apart from the person of the Father or the Son, suits them both. Also, although it is a relationship, it does not take the name of “property”, since it does not belong to one person alone; nor is it a “personal” relationship, that is, one that constitutes a person. On the other hand, the three relations of paternity, filiation and procession are qualified as “personal properties”, as constituting the persons: paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Spirit .
2 . That which proceeds by mode of knowledge, as a verb, proceeds formally in resemblance of its principle, just as that which proceeds by mode of nature. Also we have said that the procession of the divine Word is identically generation by mode of nature. But love as such does not proceed by resemblance of its principle, although in God love is consubstantial as divine. This is why the procession of Love in God is not called a generation.
3. Man, who is more perfect than other animals, has in fact more immanent operations; but it is because its perfection is achieved by mode of composition. Also, among the Angels, who are even more perfect, but simpler, there are fewer immanent operations than among man: they have neither imagination, nor sensation, etc. In God there is really only one operation, which is his essence. But we saw how it involved two processions.
4 . This argument would hold if the Holy Spirit possessed a goodness numerically distinct from that of the Father; then in fact, as by reason of his goodness the Father produces a divine person, it would be necessary for the Holy Spirit to produce one also. But it is the same and unique goodness that is common to the Father and the Holy Spirit. And if a distinction is introduced, it is because of the relationships of the people. Therefore, kindness becomes the Holy Spirit as received from another; it suits the Father as well as the principle which communicates it. But because of the relative opposition, being principle of a divine person is incompatible with the constitutive relation of the Holy Spirit; for this proceeds from the other persons who can exist in God.
5 . If it is an abstract number, which only exists in thought, it is true that every determined number has unity as its measure. But if, in the divine persons, we consider the real number, there is no longer any measurement: the three persons, we will see, only have the same and identical size, and nothing can be measured by itself. even.
Article 3 — What do our numerical terms mean in God?
Objections:
1. The unity of God is his essence. But every number is the unit repeated several times. Therefore in God every numerical term signifies the divine essence, and thus posits something in God.
2 . What is said both of God and of creatures suits God more eminently than creatures. But numerical terms do pose something in creatures. So much more in God.
3 . If numerical terms pose nothing in God and are only used to exclude an imperfection, namely: plurality, to deny unity; unity, to deny plurality; then, we turn in a vicious circle which only confuses us without resolving anything. It is unacceptable. It is therefore necessary that the numerical terms posit something in God.
In the opposite direction, S. Hilaire writes: “The affirmation of a society, that is to say of a plurality, excluded the idea of isolation and solitude (in God). ” And S. Ambroise: “When we say: one God, unity excludes a plurality of gods; and we do not place quantity in God. ” It therefore seems that, if we use terms of this kind about God, it is to deny, and not to affirm, something positive.
Answer:
The Master of Sentences says that in God our numerical terms pose nothing and only negate. Others hold the opposite.
To clarify this, we will start from the following consideration. Any plurality presupposes a division. Now there are two kinds of divisions: one material, by division of the continuum; it gives rise to number which is a species of quantity. This number is therefore only found in material realities, endowed with quantity. The other is formal division, by opposition or diversity of forms; it gives rise to a multitude which is not in a specific genus, but is part of the transcendentals; being, in fact, is one or multiple. And it is the only multitude that is found in immaterial realities.
Therefore, some only considered the multitude which is a species of discontinuous quantity; and seeing clearly that this quantity does not find a place in God, they thought that our numerical terms do not affirm anything positive in God and only deny it. Others, also considering the same type of multitude, expressed this opinion: just as science is attributed to God under the specific aspect of knowledge, and not under its generic aspect of quality, since there is no no quality in God, in the same way we affirm in God a number under the proper reason of number and not under its generic aspect of quantity.
For us, we say that the numerical terms attributed to God are not borrowed from number, which is a species of quantity; we could only attribute them to God by metaphor, like the other properties of bodies: width, length, etc. They are taken from the multitude which is a transcendental. Now this multitude is to the realities that it qualifies, as the one, convertible with being, is to being. And, as was said when discussing the unity of God, this one only adds to being the negation of a division; for one is undivided being. From then on, say what you want, “one” means this thing in its indivision. For example, by saying: man is one, we mean the nature of man as undivided. And it is the same when we describe “multiple” things: the multitude thus understood means these very things in their respective indivision. But number, which is a kind of quantity, adds an accident to being; likewise, the unity principle of number.
Attributed to God, numerical terms therefore signify the very realities that they qualify, and only add a negation. In this the Master of Sentences spoke the truth. For example, when we say: “the essence is one”, “one” means the essence in its undividedness; when we say: “the person is one”, this attribute means the person in his or her indivision; and when we say: “the persons are several”, we mean the persons, each in its own right: because, by definition, the multitude is made up of units.
Solutions:
1. The “one” which is a transcendental is more general than the substance or the relation; and “multitude” is in the same case. A numerical term can therefore designate in God either the substance or the relation, depending on the attributes to which it is added And yet the terms of this order do not only establish the essence or the relation: they add, by virtue of their own meaning, the negation of a division
2 . something positive in created being is a species of quantity. It is not quantity that we transpose analogically into God, but only the transcendental multitude, which only adds to the subjects of which it is affirmed their indivision. to each: this is the multitude that we affirm in God 3.
“ One” does not negate the multitude, but the division and this logically precedes the unity and the multitude. does not deny unity: it denies division in each of the elements constituting this multitude. All this, moreover, was explained in connection with divine unity. Moreover, it is good to know that the authorities alleged to the contrary are not sufficient proof; if plurality excludes solitude, and if unity excludes the plurality of gods, this does not mean that these terms mean nothing else. Whiteness clearly excludes blackness; but this term “whiteness” does not only mean exclusion of blackness.
Article 4 — How is the name “person” common in God?
Objections:
1 . Only one thing is common to all three people: gasoline. Now the name “person” does not directly mean essence. So it's not a common term for all three.
2 . Common is opposed to the incommunicable. But the person is incommunicable by definition: We only have to refer to the definition given by Richard de Saint-Victor. The personal name is therefore not common to all three.
3. Let us assume that it is common to them; this community is verified either really, or only by reason. This is not really, since then the three persons would be one person; nor in pure reason, since then “person” would be a universal, and in God there is neither universal, nor particular, nor genus, nor species, as we saw above. The personal name is therefore not common to all three.
On the contrary , S. Augustine says that to the question: “three what? ” we answered: three people, because the meaning of this term is common to them.
Answer:
“Person” is indeed a name common to the three: our language attests to this, since we say: “the three Persons”; just as by saying “three men”, we attest that the term “man” is common to these three subjects. But it is clear that it is not a question of a community of reality, such as that of the single essence common to the three; there would then be only one person for the three, just as there is only one essence.
We therefore asked ourselves which community this is; and the answers are multiple. Community of a negation, it is said, alleging the term “incommunicable” which is found in the definition of the person. Community of a logical intention, say others, because the definition of the person contains the term “individual”: as if we said that “horse” and “ox” have this in common, being a species . But these two answers must be rejected, because “person” is neither a negative term nor a logical term, but rather the name of a thing or reality.
Rather, here is what needs to be said. Even in these human cases, “person” is a common name, of this logical community which is that not of the genus or the species, but of the indeterminate individual. Indeed, the names of genus or species, for example “man”, “animal”, formally signify the common natures themselves, and not the logical intentions of the common natures; it is the terms “genus” or “species” which signify these intentions. While the indeterminate individual, for example: “some man”, signifies a common nature with the determinate mode of existence which belongs to singulars, namely: to be by itself subsisting apart from others. Finally, the name of a determinate singular includes in its meaning the distinct determinate characters: in “Socrates”, for example, we evoke this flesh and these bones. There is, however, a difference to note: “Some man” means the individual through his nature posed with the mode of existence specific to the singular; while the name “person” does not formally mean the individual from the side of his nature, it signifies the reality which subsists in such nature. Now, this is logically common to all divine Persons: each of them subsists in the divine nature, and subsists distinct from the others. This is how the name “person” is logically common to the three divine Persons.
Solutions:
1 . The first argument assumes a real community which we have discarded.
2 . Certainly, the person is incommunicable; however this very mode of existing incommunicably can be found common to many.
3 . This is a logical community, not a real one. This, however, does not imply that there is something universal or particular in God, nor that there is a genus or species; firstly because, even in these human cases, the community of the term “person” is not that of a genus or a species; then because the divine Persons have only one being; or genus, species or any universal predicate, is attributed to several subjects which differ in their being.